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ABSTRACT
In the physical world we have well-established mecha-
nisms for keeping children out of adult-only areas. In
the virtual world this is generally replaced by self dec-
laration. Some service providers resort to using heavy-
weight identification mechanisms, judging adulthood as
a side effect thereof. Collection of identification data ar-
guably constitutes an unwarranted privacy invasion in
this context, if carried out merely to perform adulthood
estimation. This paper presents a mechanism that ex-
ploits the adult’s more extensive exposure to public me-
dia, relying on the likelihood that they will be able to
recall details if cued by a carefully chosen picture. We
conducted an online study to gauge the viability of this
scheme. With our prototype we were able to predict that
the user was a child 99% of the time. Unfortunately the
scheme also misclassified too many adults. We discuss
our results and suggest directions for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Automatically regulating access to adult content is chal-
lenging, especially if privacy is preserved [9]. The aim
is to permit access to adults, but not to minors. In the
physical world we effortlessly categorise people, in terms
of age [24]. This makes it relatively easy for us to judge
adulthood. When we are not sure, and being sure is a
legal requirement, we may resort to identification. In the
digital world, age-group classification without identifica-
tion is challenging. While solutions exist (eg. German
e-ID), they have not yet been widely accepted [19]. The
concern is that society seems to be sleepwalking into us-
ing biometrics for this purpose [33]. Such widespread
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identification offsets the adult content provider’s legal
responsibility, but it also gives them a wealth of poten-
tially sensitive information, something they might well
abuse [49].
There is increasing concern from authorities across the
world [33, 15], that children are accessing adult con-
tent online. Recent reports indicate that approximately
200,000 minors accessed age-inappropriate content in a
single month [47], with the youngest being six years of
age. Indeed, many minors claimed to have encountered
pornographic images before the age of twelve [2]. The
impact of such unrestricted consumption on developing
minds should not be underestimated [11, 36, 47]. The
existing mechanisms, are either ineffective or intrusive
[51].
This paper explores a primary difference between adults
and children that could be used to test for adulthood.
Adults have lived longer and have accumulated more
knowledge over the course of their lifetime [42, 38]. We
propose to exploit these knowledge differences to achieve
adulthood estimation without invading privacy. Our
mechanism exploits this difference by testing the abil-
ity to label specially-chosen images correctly, essentially
implementing a privacy-preserving access control mech-
anism. We first explain how we identified suitable im-
ages, and then how we used these images to judge the
adulthood of experimental subjects in two iterations. We
conclude by discussing our outcomes and presenting our
suggestions for future developments. In summary, this
paper’s contributions are:
• The concept of knowledge-based regulation of access
to adult content;
• Proven accuracy of the scheme based on two studies,
using empirically validated images to perform adult-
hood estimation;
• Discussion of the implementation challenges and pro-
posals for future work.
RELATED WORK
We first review existing mechanisms and then explain
why we deployed images to test knowledge.
Existing Techniques
Parents use a variety of techniques to prevent their chil-
dren from accessing adult content [33]: (1) education and
supervision, (2) automated filtering on devices and/or
(3) relying on content providers to prevent access.
Education alone is not entirely effective [30], judging by
its efficacy in other contexts [22]. It could prove use-
ful in conjunction with supervision. Nevertheless, while
supervision may seem sensible it may have unintended
consequences. Chirkov et al. argue that adolescents need
to be allowed to express their autonomy, competence and
relatedness in order to successfully come of age [10]. This
suggests that parents and teachers should gradually re-
lax control rather than tightening their grip if the child
is to become a responsible adult.
Automated blocking and filtering of adult content is the
second option [33]. A range of technical parental con-
trol tools can help parents to shield minors from age-
inappropriate content [32], but the effectiveness of such
solutions is debatable [6]. Unfortunately, many soft-
ware solutions are ineffective because they either over-
or under-block digital content [43]. These inaccuracies
may be the result of guardians struggling with configu-
ration options and user interfaces [7, 29]. Furthermore,
Fleming et al. reported little difference in exposure to
inappropriate material when blocking software was, or
was not, installed [13]. A possible explanation is that
minors are innovative enough to bypass such software.
Moreover, there is also evidence that children resent their
use, since they feel that the use of such software by their
parents provides evidence of a lack of trust [28]. The
reality is that the majority of guardians do not deploy
automated filtering tools [31].
The previous two strategies are within the control of
the guardian. When this is delegated to adult content
providers, the deployed mechanism is usually either com-
pletely ineffective or overly intrusive. The ineffective
approaches typically take the form of self-declaration,
whereby individuals must declare their age or date of
birth [52]. The process is elegant and effective at pre-
venting accidental access. However, evidence suggests
that many minors deliberately seek out, rather than ac-
cidentally stumble upon, adult content [13]. Livingstone
et al. reported that 22% of surveyed 9-19 year-olds had
purposefully accessed age-inappropriate content [25].
Some vendors go a step further, requiring a valid credit
card, for example. This is based on the assumption that
only adults can own a credit card but actually posses-
sion of such a token does not constitute proof of adult-
hood [39] especially since sufficiently motivated minors
can easily obtain one [21].
The token-based technique crosses the invisible privacy
boundary. Once privacy is violated, identification is car-
ried out and age is established as a side effect. Vendors
are able to gather far more information than is strictly re-
quired. Many other mechanisms, such as biometrics, also
identify to authenticate. Biometrics seems an attractive
alternative at first glance since pre-adolescent minors are
smaller than adults, by and large, and this can easily be
measured, especially as modern devices now routinely
incorporate the requisite sensors. Unfortunately, the ef-
ficacy of the biometric-based approach has been ques-
tioned [49, 40]. Furthermore, there are genuine privacy
concerns surrounding the collection and storage of bio-
metrics belonging to minors without proper legislation
mediating their use, and the storage and retention of
such data [54, 14].
Another even more invasive solution is that of verifying
identity by cross-referencing customer information such
as name and address, date of birth with information held
by other vendors or governments. This assumes that
the other systems’ data is accurate [39, 49] but there
is evidence that such systems are easily manipulated by
adolescents [48].
Based on this summary, we can conclude that the cur-
rent range of third party mechanisms is unsatisfactory.
They either present no bar to entry, or identify in or-
der to establish adulthood, violating privacy. Moreover,
many of these mechanisms introduce a substantial time
lag into the access process which punishes adults instead
of merely excluding children. The aim is to find a mid-
dle ground, something that estimates adulthood more
effectively without identification. Such a solution would
preserve the privacy of adult, or child, wanting to access
adult content.
Using Images to Test Memory
There are two reasons for using images instead of simple
questions to test knowledge. The first is that we inhabit
the era of information being at everyone’s fingertips, via
search engines. If you ask someone a textual question
they can search for the answer online — proving nothing
more than an ability to search. If we use images to spark
a memory it becomes harder for people to find the answer
online.
The second reason is that people remember images bet-
ter than the words than name them [27, 34, 35, 46].
Vision is the dominant human sense, being attended to
before other modalities [37]. The sighted human effort-
lessly and almost subconsciously processes millions of
images every day. Over time, an internal database of im-
age forms and descriptors are accumulated, to support
instantaneous recognition [46]. Lexical labels are linked
with these objects, and every time the person interacts
with the object and names it, that link gets stronger.
Images appear to deliver two benefits: they are not as
easy to search for, and they are more memorable than
text.
We plan to use images in a recall-based context — not
recognition as is the case with many psychological exper-
iments proving the superiority of picture memory. Un-
like recognition, recall requires provision of a lexical label
from someone who is being cued by an image. There is
evidence that people can label images they have seen
before [8, 26]. Unfortunately, the labels are essentially
proper nouns, and these are seldom descriptive, that can
cause the memorial link between the name and the object
to disappear or weaken over time [5]. There is also the
“tip of the tongue” effect to consider [4, 18]. This, too,
is particularly prevalent for proper noun labels. These
labelling difficulties might impact the efficacy of our our
proposed adulthood estimation mechanism, and we will
return to this aspect in our discussion section.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that this mechanism
excludes those with vision problems, and any deploy-
ment would have to be done in conjunction with some
other mechanism to cater for those who cannot see the
images well enough to label them.
DESIGN
The proposed mechanism acts to ensure that adults can
access content but that minors are excluded. The con-
cept is simple: an individual is presented with a grid of
M images. They are required to label each image. The
individual does not necessarily need to label all images
correctly, but simply reach a threshold of N images to
be classified as an adult. The expectation is that adults
will be able to label at least N of M images but that
minors will not. The mechanism does not effect identi-
fication, use biometric data or require the use of issued
tokens, essentially preserving privacy.
The simplicity of this approach does not mean that
achieving it is easy or simple. We faced two primary
challenges in developing such a knowledge-based adult-
hood estimation mechanism: (1) finding the right set of
images, and (2) delivering an accurate estimation.
(1) Image Identification
The first aim was to identify a set of candidate images
for the proposed mechanism. The following null and
alternative hypotheses were used to accept or reject a
particular image:
H10: There is no difference between adults and minors
when correctly identifying an image.
H11: There is a difference between adults and minors
when correctly identifying an image.
(2) Estimating Adulthood
The challenge is that in estimating we inhabit the realms
of probability. Hence we will make a judgement, and
some of the time that judgement will be incorrect. We
need to decide how many images to display, M , and how
many of these the person should label correctly, N , to
be judged an adult. The numbers chosen for N and M
reflect the system’s tolerance for error. The following
hypotheses were tested:
H20: Adults will not have a different mean score than
minors.
H21: Adults will have a higher mean score than minors.
H22: Adults will have a lower mean score than minors
The mechanism should judge adulthood to an accept-
able level of accuracy. The classification of an individual
can be categorised as a true positive, true negative, false
positive or false negative. Table 1 illustrates the values
of each, as a contingency table with the columns rep-
resenting actual values and rows representing prediction
values.
Actual
Adults Minors
Adults True False PPV
Prediction
Positive Positive
Minors False True NPV
Negative Negative
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
Table 1. Contingency Table of Performance
Table 1 depicts the sensitivity, specificity, positive predic-
tive value, negative predictive value and accuracy. The
sensitivity (true positive rate) of the mechanism is the
correct prediction of adults and the specificity (true neg-
ative rate) of the mechanism is its ability to exclude
minors. The PPV, the positive predictive value, is the
probability that the mechanism will correctly predict an
adult. The NPV, the negative predictive value, is the
probability that the mechanism correctly predicts a mi-
nor. PPV and NPV reflect the proportion of adults and
minors in the sample and whether they are correctly as-
sessed by the mechanism [1]. Lastly, accuracy is a mea-
sure of the true positives and true negatives in the pop-
ulation.
Delineating Children
Adults and children are generally defined in biological
terms, with 18 years being the pivotal point as individu-
als enter adulthood on their 18th birthday. Different so-
cieties have different rules about people at various ages.
In the UK people can marry at 16 and drink alcohol at
18, but in the US citizens have to be 18 to marry and 21
to drink alcohol. In some African countries marriage is
allowed at 15, and in some European countries it is legal
to drink alcohol at 16. Instead of focusing on 18 as a piv-
otal age, therefore, we should focus on the progression
from childhood to adulthood, and the particular stage
where they are most in need of protection.
The literature highlights the vulnerability of the 11-12
age group. This is when young people start spending
less time with their families [23] and also start needing
the support of adults outside the home [41]. If this is not
provided at school they might well go online to get what
they need. This is also the age when children, as a con-
sequence of transferring from a relatively small primary
school to a large secondary school, start to experience
feelings of anonymity [44] and start interacting with the
opposite sex [45] since they are embarking on puberty
(earlier than in previous centuries, now to be expected
at 11-12 [17]). Hence online anonymity is likely to ap-
peal to them. At this age they start becoming more
independent [3] and moving into adulthood and many
are eager to embrace adult activities [20]. They need
to be permitted increasing levels of autonomy to mature
[10]. Parents and teachers therefore slowly relax con-
trols to allow this. Unfortunately, the period of enter-
ing secondary school is when self-esteem decreases [53],
and this only recovers when they settle properly into
secondary school. Pre-adolescents are considered more
vulnerable to abuse than older or younger children [12]
and this reduced self-esteem might well be the reason for
this vulnerability. Thus the 11-12 age group is a pivotal
age, where efforts to enter the adult world need to be
thwarted to protect them from that which they are not
yet ready to deal with.
Finally, Fleming et al. [13] reported that younger adoles-
cents were far less safety conscious when using the Web.
Hence, in identifying images and testing our mechanism,
we will focus on trying to distinguish between 11-12 year
olds, and over 18s.
STUDY ONE
We started by identifying suitable images, then pro-
ceeded to test them in an estimation mechanism.
Identifying Images
An initial set of 104 images was gathered. Images were
culled from various sources and aimed to include images
of public figures and significant events, from the perspec-
tive of Western popular culture. The images within the
set can be categorised, as follows: (1) Entertainment:
music, film & television, (2) World Events, (3) Iconic
Figures and (4) Politicians. Examples of images are:
Michael Jackson, World Trade Centre, Dolly the Sheep
and David Cameron.
Participants
60 minors and 74 adults participated. Participants aged
18 and over were recruited using traditional means, such
as social networks and mailing lists. A number of schools
were contacted in the United Kingdom, predominately
Scotland and England, to obtain permission for their
pupils to participate.
Procedure
The purpose of the survey was explained to the partic-
ipant. The participant was then asked to complete a
few simple questions pertaining to their nationality and
age-range. Participants were then presented with each
image and asked to label the image, i.e. identify the im-
age content. The participants were asked to do this for
each of the images in the initial set. The performance of
each participant was analysed to determine if they had
successfully identified the image or not. The label each
participant submitted was analysed automatically using
Levenshtein distance [16] to compensate for spelling er-
rors.
Results
The survey was completed by all 134 participants, rep-
resenting 60 minors and 74 adults. Adults scored higher
on average (µ=54.32) than minors (µ=24.16) when la-
belling images within the initial set.
The next step was to identify those images that chil-
dren struggle to label but that adults are able to la-
bel. The decision was taken to implement a threshold,
as statistical analysis for all images was deemed unnec-
essary given certain images were easily identifiable by
both groups. Consequently, images were selected when
75% more of adults correctly labelled it and only 25% or
less of children correctly labelled it. The resulting 16 im-
ages were then statistically analysed using a Chi-Square
test for association to determine if age-group was inde-
pendent of performance. If performance for a particular
image was not independent of age-group, it was deemed
that H10 could be rejected and H11 accepted. In those
cases were there were fewer than 5 participants in any of
the contingency tables, used in the statistical analysis,
a Fisher’s exact test was used. The motivation for not
using Fisher’s exact test in all cases is that it may have
been too conservative and lead to the rejection of viable
images. Consequently, we deemed the Chi-square test
adequate for the purpose of confirming image use and
only defaulted to a Fisher’s exact test when necessary.
The statistical analysis for each of the 16 images showed
a strong association between adults and labelling perfor-
mance when compared to minors. Consequently, in each
case H10 was rejected and H11 was accepted and each
image was added to the evaluation set.
Adulthood Estimation
The image identification stage pinpointed the image set
for evaluation of the proposed mechanism. We could
now proceed to test the mechanism. The image set of 16
images that emerged from the previous stage was used.
The proposed mechanism was web-based and accessible
from any device with a fully featured web-browser.
Participants
A total of 33 participants were recruited for the evalua-
tion, comprising of 24 adults and 9 minors. Participants
from the previous stage were excluded from this stage.
A similar recruitment process to the previous stage was
used.
Procedure
Participants accessed the system from a web browser.
The first page provided information about the purpose
of the investigation and what was expected. The partici-
pant was then asked for their actual age. The participant
was than presented with six images and asked to label
them. The system then predicted the user’s age, based
on the correctness of the image label, using Levenshtein
distance [16] to compensate for spelling errors. The pre-
diction was logged and participants thanked.
Results
The evaluation was completed by 33 participants, com-
prising 24 adults and 9 minors. Table 2 outlines the
performance of the mechanism. The sensitivity of the
mechanism, i.e. correct prediction of adults, is approxi-
mately 96%. The specificity of the mechanism, i.e. cor-
rect prediction of minors, is approximately 89%.
Actual
Adults Minors
Adults 23 1 PPV
Prediction
≈96%
Minors 1 8 NPV
≈89%
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
≈96% ≈89% ≈92%
Table 2. Mechanism Performance
An independent samples t-test was performed to deter-
mine if there was any difference in scores between adults
and minors. Upon inspection of box-plots there were no
outliers greater than 3 box-lengths from the edge of the
box, but adult scores were not normally distributed, as
assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p < .05). However,
scores for minors were normally distributed, as assessed
using a Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p > .05), and there was ho-
mogeneity of variances for scores for adult and children,
as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p
= .870). It thus became clear that a nonparametric test
such as the Mann-Whitney U-test would be unsuitable
due to the structure of the data, and the assumptions
that this test makes. Consequently, the decision was
taken to continue with the independent samples t-test.
The reality is that adults scored higher (5.04 ± 1.197)
than minors (1.78 ± 1.202). There was a statistically
significant difference in mean scores between adults and
minors, with adults scoring 3.26 (95% CI, 2.31 to 4.22)
higher than minors, t(31) = 6.968, p = < .001.
The statistical analysis supported acceptance of H21 and
rejection of H20 and H22. However, the small samples,
unbalanced groups and the fact that one of the groups
was not normally distributed, undermines the validity of
our statistical analysis. Consequently, the data and anal-
ysis does not allow us to confirm or reject the hypotheses
with any degree of certainty.
The aforementioned issues in the analysis could arguably
be addressed using an alternative approach. A nonpara-
metric equivalent to an independent t-test might well
have produced stronger results. In this case, an accept-
able alternative would have been a Mann Whitney U-
test. However, nonparametric tests make assumptions
about the structure of data. The Mann Whitney U-test,
for example, requires the groups to be similarly struc-
tured. Given that this is not the case, we could only
reasonably compare and report mean ranks rather than
the scores themselves. Consequently, it was felt that
adopting such an alternative approach would only serve
to muddy the issue and limit subsequent discussions, as
the focus would not be on mean scores but on ranks.
Discussion
The first study taught us lessons which fed into the next
stage.
Image Identification: (1) Images of events appear to
be unsuitable but images related to people can deliver
the required distinctions if chosen carefully. (2) The
best images for supporting adulthood-estimation are
those that peak in the public media 15-20 years before
the current date, and are then revisited from time to
time so that they re-enter public consciousness.
Accuracy: (1) We should not ask participants to self-
declare their age. In retrospect this was na¨ıve. We ought
to have two different sites for adults and children to use
so that we are sure of the adulthood of the participant.
(2) The first prototype used a challenge set comprising
M=6 and N=2 to support a judgement. This might well
set the bar too low.
STUDY TWO
Having learnt lessons from the first study, we commenced
with our main study. We started with an image identifi-
cation phase to identify a larger number of suitable im-
ages, then used these to trial a knowledge-based adult-
hood estimation prototype.
Image Identification
We expanded image topics beyond well-known people to
also include images of vintage cars, old sweets and movies
& television shows. We did not use images of widely pub-
licised world events as the first study had shown these
kinds of images to be suboptimal. We gathered a to-
tal of 481 images in categories: Famous People, Sweets,
Cars and Film & Television Shows. The sweet name
was obscured. It was, unfortunately, quite difficult to
find suitable images of yesteryear’s sweet wrappers. Car
images depicted vintage cars with the logos and model
names obscured.
The images used in the survey focused strongly on West-
ern popular culture because we were exploiting peo-
ple’s exposure to images in public media and these are
country-dependent, and we were going to test it primar-
ily in the UK and the US. The main condition for an im-
age to be considered suitable for use was whether adults,
and not children, were likely to have been exposed to
the image content (i.e. part of popular culture at least
a decade ago).
Participants
As argued earlier, children under 13 years of age are
considered to be most vulnerable. For this reason the
image identification was carried out amongst S1 and S2
pupils (11 to 13 years of age) in two Scottish high schools.
There was a total of 1601 participants, 1382 minors and
219 adults. A similar recruitment process was used as
the previous study, with adults recruited using social
networking services and mailing lists. Children were re-
cruited by contacting various schools and obtaining per-
mission from teachers.
Procedure
The first study asked participants to label all images. We
could not realistically ask people to do this for all 481
candidate images. Moreover, the schools we contacted
indicated that they could not allocate more than 5-10
minutes to this task, being under some pressure to com-
plete their curriculum. We therefore decided to choose
30 images randomly to show to each participant. We did
the same for adults and children.
We explained what the study was about, then collected
demographics. We displayed 30 randomly chosen im-
ages, one at a time, and asked them to provide labels.
Participants could also click on a button to pass. No cues
were provided. Auto-fill in the label field was disabled.
We recorded how long they took to label the images. We
concluded by thanking them for their time and partici-
pation.
The system then determined the correctness of the la-
bels. Participants’ answers were compared to the correct
labels for each image (both converted to lowercase, with
punctuation and spaces removed). In case of the images
of famous people, participants were expected to provide
the name (eg. John Kennedy), not the role (eg. “Pres-
ident”), nicknames (eg. “JFK”) or fictional character
names in the case of actors (eg.“Rocky”). A Levenshtein
string distance algorithm [16] was used to accommodate
spelling mistakes.
Results
1382 children and 219 adults participated in the image
identification. The majority of child participants were
born (1094) and raised (1114) in the UK.
When we examined the image labels it became clear that
sweets and cars were unsuitable. Cars were too difficult
even for adults to label. The Famous People and Film
& TV categories delivered far better results since there
was a clear divide between adults and children in terms
of ability to label them. The mean score for children was
10% and for adults 26%.
Outcome
We realised that a timeout was not feasible when we
considered the average labelling time. Web searching is
so fast that we could not set any meaningful timeout
period which would not also prevent people from typing
in the answers they actually knew.
Since we were not able to test labelling of all images by
all participants we had variable numbers of labels for
our images, which barred reliable statistical testing. We
thus decided that in order for an image to be considered
suitable for use in the adulthood estimator it had to
be labelled correctly by at least 50% of adults and by
no more than 20% of children. This seemed to divide
adults and children satisfactorily. A total of 44 images
(9%) emerged from this stage.
Adulthood Estimation
To prepare the images we attempted to foil circumven-
tion attempts, in this case searching for the image on-
line. Since we could not feasibly prevent searching by
implementing a timeout we decided rather to distort the
images. The idea was to edit each image so that its
content would still be recognisable to humans but not
to software such as Google Image Search. Each im-
age was edited using age-effect filter(old photography)
as well as two artistic filters (ink outline and coloured
pencil). However, for a few images this was not enough
to deter an online image search. In this case, the im-
ages were edited using a texture filter (fissured) and an
artistic filter (coloured pencil) which gave a very simi-
lar effect to that of age-effect filters combined with ink
outlines and coloured pencil yet this indeed prevented
an online image Search from returning any results. We
disabled the right click and gave the images anonymous
names.
Figure 1. Two faces, clear and distorted[50, 55]
Participants
For the purposes of the study three Scottish high schools
were approached and asked to allow their first and second
year pupils to participate in the survey. Adult partici-
pants were friends of those involved in the project but
the majority of participants consisted of students from
the University of Glasgow, both local and international.
An invitation was also posted online.
Procedure
The experiment started with a page explaining what the
study was about. Participants were instructed to la-
bel the images and to leave the label field blank if they
could not. Demographics were collected, depending on
whether this was the adult or child website.
Six distorted images were first displayed for labelling.
The image set was randomised for each participant and
no cues were provided.
One image in each set was a decoy image. Since many of
our participants were children we did not want them to
feel too discouraged by the process so the decoy image
was one that they had a high probability of recognising.
The correctness of the decoy image label was not used to
judge adulthood. Depending on their performance, one
of two things would happen:
• Able to Make a Judgment:
If they labelled 4 or 5 images correctly it was likely
that this was an adult (a Levenshtein string distance
algorithm accommodated spelling errors.). If they got
fewer than three correct (1 or 2), it was likely that this
was a child. The next screen thus showed Challenge
Set A again, in the clear, with the label fields pre-
populated with the previously provided labels. They
could then label the images again or re-submit initial
labels.
• Ambiguity:
If the system couldn’t make a clear judgement a new
set of images (Set B) was displayed. After they had
labelled the new images, the first and second sets were
displayed again, in the clear, in case this helped to jog
their memory. They could change their initial labels.
The system concluded by telling the participant whether
they had been judged adult or child, and thanked them
for participating. A comment box was provided.
The reasoning behind this implementation was as fol-
lows. If we displayed 5 images then, based on the image
identification results, we could expect adults to be able
to guess 50% of these. This converts to ±3 images in the
challenge set. If they identified four out of the five, they
scored 80% and were classified as adult. If they identi-
fied only three, another set would be displayed. If they
were able to identify three again (scoring 6 out of 9 =
67%), they would have passed the test and be classified
as adult.
Children, based on our previous findings, only have a 1
in 5 chance of identifying images. If we presented them
with 5 images we could expect them only to identify one
or two of these. If by some fluke they managed to get
three right in the first set, they would probably not be
able to repeat that in the second set of images, and would
be classified as a child.
Results
869 child participants aged 11 to 13 years participated
with 356 adults participating. 79% of the adults were
either British (31%) or American (48%). Child partic-
ipants were mostly born (844) and raised (860) in the
UK.
Accuracy:
Each participant was required to label at least 67% of
the images correctly to be classified as adult. 99.7% of
children were classified correctly when labeling distorted
images and 99.08% when labeling in-the-clear images.
At the same time, almost 34% of adult participants were
Actual
Adults Minors
Adults 154 8 PPV
Prediction
≈95%
Minors 202 861 NPV
≈81%
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
≈43% ≈99% ≈83%
Table 3. Mechanism Performance for Non-Distorted Im-
ages
classified correctly by the system when labeling distorted
images and just over 43% when labeling the in-the-clear
images.
The poor results with respect to the adults were un-
expected so we posted a random sample of 20 images
from our image set on CrowdFlower, a crowd sourcing
website. We posted two jobs: (1) one with the images
distorted and (2) one with the images in the clear. Each
job collected responses from 100 participants. We had
to remove three fraudulent responses from the first job,
and four from the second1, but we were left with a large
enough number of reasonable attempts to draw conclu-
sions about recognition rates. The recognition rate for
the distorted images was 38.66% whereas the recogni-
tion rate with the clear images was 49.31%. These num-
bers are remarkably close to the percentages in our study
(33.89% and 43.26%), given the differences between the
two population groups. This gave us more confidence in
the paucity of our adult responses, suggesting that this
was not an anomaly caused by our sample.
Adults scored better than children with the distorted
images (2.14 ± 1.70) vs (0.18 ± 0.02). The assumption
of homogeneity was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test
for equality of variances (p < .001). Therefore a Welch
t-test is reported. There was a statistically significant
difference in mean scores between adults and children,
with adults scoring higher than children, 1.91 (95% CI,
1.71 to 2.10), t(325.119)=19.29, p< .001.
With respect to the clear images, adults scored higher
(2.59 ± 1.80) than children (0.39 ± 0.73). The assump-
tion of homogeneity was violated, as assessed by Lev-
ene’s test for equality of variances (p < .001). There-
fore a Welch t-test is reported. There was a statistically
significant difference in the scores between adults and
children, with adults scoring higher than children, 2.20
(95% CI, 1.99 to 2.41), t (340.167) = 20.75, p < .001.
Timings:
We examined the timings of responses and discovered a
significant difference between the times taken by children
and adults labelling the distorted images (p < 0.001).
1These were nonsense responses, with labels such as x entered
for all images
There was no significant difference between the times
adults and children took to label the clear images, how-
ever. We will discuss the implications of this in the next
section.
DISCUSSION
Accuracy
Our knowledge-based adult estimation mechanism de-
tected 99% of child participants, using N/M being
greater than 67%. Unfortunately, the mechanism also
classified too many adults as children (false negatives).
An analysis was subsequently performed to investigate
how the false positive and negative rate would change if
the minimum score, N , was reduced (shown in Table 4).
The percentage values for both child and adult partic-
ipants represent the proportion of each group classified
as adult.
% False Positives % True Positives
Min Threshold Distorted Clear Distorted Clear
20% (1 out of 5) 17.91 30.15 82.22 86.24
40% (2 out of 5) 4.45 9.2 64.44 72.47
44% (4 out of 9) 0.51 2.3 41.67 50.84
56% (5 out of 9) 0.3 1.61 38.06 47.75
60% (3 out of 5) 0.8 2.88 43.33 51.97
67% (6 out of 9) 0.3 0.92 33.89 43.26
Table 4. Tweaking Thresholds
The distortions might have deterred recognition. Some
comments referred to this: “It was really, really difficult
to see who they were when the pictures werent clear”. If
the distortions made recognition difficult, it is indicative
of the unfortunate yet inevitable tension between pre-
venting circumvention and maximising accuracy. Still,
this would not have made the adults fail the test, since
we displayed the images in the clear too.
Adults took significantly longer to label the distorted
images. What were they doing differently? Four dif-
ferent things might have happened when they examined
the image: (1) they recognised the person, and knew the
label; (2) they recognised the person but couldn’t come
up with label; (3) the distortions made it difficult to be
sure; or (4) they did not know who the person was.
(1) does not explain the time lag. Using an online image
search would be the natural thing to do if (2) were true.
With no timeout this strategy might have been deployed.
One of the comments confirms that this happened at
least in one case “I admit that I googled Lisa Kudrows
last name, because I knew who she was but just could not
remember the last name for whatever reason.”.
Was this a manifestation of tip-of-the-tongue syndrome
[4]? Eight participant comments alluded to this eg. “I
think recognized the guy from Monty Python (first pic-
ture) but couldnt remember his name (not Michael Palin)
and felt I shouldnt look it up.”.
If (3) were the case the time lag could simply be due to a
participant spending some time examining the picture.
There were three comments related to this, including:
“thank goodness there were clearer pictures later!”. In
this case circumvention resistance clearly impacted ac-
curacy.
What about (4)? We used images that 50% or more of
adults were able to label, but that is a probability, not
a certainty. It could have been the case that the test
was just too hard. They could have attempted a online
image search, which would explain the time lag.
We believe that the images presented the adults with too
much of a challenge. Those who knew enough about the
depicted person to search probably found the name via
a search engine. Some may have felt that this was cheat-
ing, but it is fairly safe to conclude that the combination
of the hard to identify images, and the requirement for
a pass rate of over 67%, probably led to the estimation
mechanism delivering too many false negatives.
It might be reasonable to lower the minimum threshold
to 40% (2 out of 5) or to 60% (3 out of 5). On the
other hand, as more adults are correctly classified, so
the number of false positives, in terms of children be-
ing classified as adults, increases (see Table 4). This is
where context comes in. Some adult content is far more
sensitive than other, as reflected by the different ratings
applied to films, and the tolerance for error might well
be aligned to the nature of the content being protected
by the access control mechanism.
Foiling Circumvention Attempts
We used distorted images which would deliver no results
if fed into image search engines. So we know that an
online image search would not have delivered any re-
sults. Any adulthood-estimation mechanism has to con-
tend with the ingenuous efforts of determined children.
What would an enterprising child do if he or she were de-
termined to access adult content and this mechanism was
barring entry? The child could feasibly post the image
onto a social networking site, asking others to identify
it. This, of course, would take time and even a relatively
long timeout could help to foil this tactic. Such a posting
might also alert a responsible adult to the child’s activ-
ities. They could also send the image to an older friend
or sibling and ask for help in identifying it. When we
rejected the idea of a timeout earlier that was because
we couldn’t prevent online searching with a timeout. It
does seem more feasible to prevent children consulting
other children with a timeout since that will probably
take longer.
We should also implement some kind of mechanism to
discourage repeat attempts. A doubling delay would be
very effective — so that no further requests are accepted
from a particular IP address for a certain period if the
previous attempt failed.
Future Work
The primary challenge is addressing deployment-related
issues. The first issue is bootstrapping the solution
with a viable image set. Whereas a time-consuming col-
lection and curating process was reasonable to support
a research project, it is unrealistic in a real-life solution.
Consequently, an automated process to collect and cu-
rate images is required. Secondly, such a process would
have to incorporate some notion of periodic refreshing of
the image set to tackle evolving public consciousness and
improvements in online search tools. Furthermore, mi-
nors will adopt other strategies to defeat the mechanism,
eg. creating online communities to exchange answers.
Moreover, even if an automated process could rapidly
deliver viable images, it would encounter difficulties re-
lated to the number of well-known personalities avail-
able for use. There is a finite number of individuals and
events that can be used in this context.
Nevertheless, even if all the aforementioned issues are
tackled and an evergreen image set can be created, the
convenience of such a solution is debatable. The solu-
tion may seem viable when presented prior to consuming
a lengthy 2-hour motion picture, but seems excessive if
the user is consuming several short videos via YouTube,
for example. These challenges would have to be over-
come if this mechanism’s potential is to be realised in
practice.
If we are able to resolve the deployment challenges, two
aspects of the current solution require attention. (1)
Setting N and M : What should N and M be? This
is likely to depend on the level of certainty required that
the user is an adult. The required certainty will proba-
bly be linked to the content it is shielding, and we will
consider this a matter for future research.
(2) Easing The Process for Adults: To ameliorate
the tip of the tongue problem we could accept meta-data
instead of a label. This would lead to greater complexity
since even more spelling errors would have to be accom-
modated and it would slow the estimation process down.
Moreover, search engines already help people to fix on
a name given meta data, development in this area does
not seem warranted.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a knowledge-based mecha-
nism for classifying an online user as either an adult or a
child. The mechanism was able to correctly classify the a
user as a child with 99% accuracy. It also currently deliv-
ers an unacceptably high rate of false negatives, barring
far too many adults. It is a clear improvement over self-
declaration, and, most importantly, does not violate the
user’s privacy.
It would be na¨ıve to believe that we can craft a mecha-
nism that uses one technique, in solo, to solve this tricky
problem of adulthood estimation. Our desire for simplic-
ity of purpose and solution cannot be satisfied in this
case. There are some directions to take this research,
which are certainly worth pursuing, since parents cur-
rently face unprecedented challenges in protecting their
children.
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